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Despite the official optimism of all parties about the resumption of the Riyadh agreement, many challenges remain for observers. In the lead are the potential anti-deal measures carried out within government institutions by the pro-Qatari current, which has worked over the past period to block the implementation of the agreement by questioning it. The first Riyadh Agreement was signed on 23 November 2013 by the King of Saudi Arabia, the Emir of Kuwait and the Emir of Qatar, in which all three promised “no interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf Cooperation Council State”, “no support for dissident groups that oppose their states”, “no support for antagonistic media”, and “no support for the Muslim Brotherhood.” [or other groups] that threaten the security and stability of Council member States,” among other safeguards. The heads of state of the other three GCC member states, Bahrain, Oman and Vae, approved the agreement the following day. After the official Saudi statement, Nizar Haitham, the STC spokesman, said at a press briefing that the STC supports the Arab coalition`s efforts to implement the Riyadh agreement. He also announced the abandonment of self-management by the STC in response to the call made by the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and its commitment to ensure the success of the efforts of the leaders of the two brotherly countries to “implement the Riyadh agreement, achieve security and stability and unite collective efforts of confrontation with Houthi militias and terrorist groups”. as well as the development of the south. Governorates. Al Jazeera looks at some of the key features of the agreement below. “This agreement will shift many combat routes to strong active pressure on the Houthis and make the fight against corruption and sabotage and terrorism networks more effective and organized. The reactivation of state institutions and the consolidation of their authority unite the will of all anti-Houthi forces, which will dissipate and undermine the propaganda of Qatar and the (Muslim) Brotherhood regarding the STC and the role of the coalition,” he added. Peter Salisbury, Crisis Group`s senior analyst for Yemen, notes that the agreement does everything it can to prevent the central political dispute between the STC and the government.

As such, “it is widely seen as an emergency solution to avoid civil war during a war and improve the government`s credibility as an actor in the UN-led peace talks,” he told MEMO. He assumes that the incentive to the STC is a place of discussion where he can formulate his request for independence from the south. From Feierstein`s point of view, the agreement is limited in scope and does not resolve all existing conflicts and divisions and does not create new ones. . . .